International movement of athletic horses: Quarantine and regulatory controls



International movement of athletic horses


Quarantine and regulatory controls


Patricia M. Ellis and Brian D. Stewart



Introduction


The elite athletic horse of today is a global commodity. During the past decade, the volume of international movement of horses by air transport has grown dramatically.1 Horses now travel for a diverse range of events including racing, dressage, eventing, show jumping, carriage driving and endurance riding in an ever-increasing number of countries. Traditionally most international events involving imported horses have been located in Europe and North America. New transport patterns are emerging with the advent of new competition venues in Eastern Europe, South America, the Arabian Peninsula, Asia and Africa2 and the development of complex itineraries by horses visiting multiple countries to compete in races held within a relatively short period.3


The modern equine athlete can move vast distances rapidly and complete journeys well within the incubation period of most infectious diseases. History has shown that without adequate safeguards this can lead to explosive outbreaks of disease.46 The increased volume of horse movement in a changing world trading environment poses significant quarantine challenges to regulatory authorities who must exclude foreign diseases from their countries without undue restriction to international trade.2,7


Governments and national authorities conducting international competitions have understandable concerns that:



• horses imported for a competition could bring in disease to the local population


• disease could occur in foreign horses due to exposure to a disease in the local horses


• a disease outbreak could result in cancellation of an important international event, especially if all horses (visiting and local) are held within the same competition venue


• prompt departure of foreign horses to their country of usual residency or next destination could be compromised by:



• horses returning from overseas could introduce disease into their country of normal residency.


Equine veterinarians in the private sector play an important role in the preparation of horses for export and in supervision of the health and welfare of horses during transport to and temporary residency in foreign countries. To avoid problems, unnecessary delays and loss of client goodwill, private sector veterinarians need to have a sound understanding of quarantine and regulatory requirements which allow horses to move safely between destinations.8,9



International spread of equine diseases


Economic, biological, political and ecological factors


A variety of factors have the potential to affect the global distribution and occurrence of equine diseases including:10,11



Changes in agricultural practices can indirectly influence the distribution of arboviruses by favoring the expansion of vector habitats.12 For example, increases in irrigated rice production and expansion of the pig breeding industry are thought to have contributed to expansion of the geographic range of Japanese encephalitis in the Asian region.



Disease and horse-related factors


Potential for disease spread by international movement is influenced by the epidemiology of the disease, the intended use of horses and whether horses are imported on a temporary or permanent basis.


The equine diseases most likely to be transferred across national borders are those characterized by an asymptomatic carrier state (e.g. equine infectious anemia, piroplasmosis, contagious equine metritis, equine viral arteritis, and dourine). The potential for their transfer is obviously greater if horses are imported on a permanent basis.10,11 The latter three diseases are transmitted by the venereal route.


Horses imported on a temporary basis for competition or performance pose little risk of introducing diseases spread by the venereal route if they are prohibited from breeding during temporary residency. Likewise, if the arthropod vectors of a disease are not present in a country, temporary import of horses that would be otherwise ineligible (e.g. horses testing positive for piroplasmosis) under controlled conditions presents a much lower risk than horses imported on a permanent basis and released into the national herd.13 In the latter case potential for iatrogenic spread by contaminated needles would be possible.


Horses imported to a country on a permanent basis pose a far greater threat of introducing disease than horses imported for a short-term stay under appropriate conditions of management. Competition horses imported for major races and events are registered animals, travel on passports and have a known residency, vaccination and disease testing history. They are kept under constant veterinary supervision before, during and after the event. During their brief residence, visiting horses have only limited exposure to the local horse population and are not used for breeding.2,13



Country factors

Evaluation of country factors, such as zoning and border controls, veterinary services, horse industry structure, disease control legislation, laboratory testing capacity and surveillance programs, are important inputs for assessing the likelihood of hazards being present in the horse population of an exporting country. Reliable and transparent information about the health status of a country’s horses is critical for safe international movement.14,15


Border crossings can be more easily regulated in island countries such as Australia and New Zealand than in countries with land borders. Expansion of the European Union (EU) into Eastern Europe has created new disease control challenges as evidenced by the recent spread of equine infectious anemia from Romania to other EU member states.16



Impact of exotic disease outbreaks

An exotic disease outbreak can have a profound effect on the horse industry in an affected country and cause serious economic loss, disruption to normal activity and social distress.


Horses now travel from one hemisphere to another by air transport and complete their journeys within the incubation period of most major diseases. Spread of equine influenza, in particular, has increased since the introduction of air transport. In the past 30 years, the introduction of imported horses to susceptible indigenous populations has been responsible for explosive outbreaks of equine influenza including in South Africa (1986 and 2003), India (1987), Jamaica (1989), Hong Kong (1992), United Arab Emirates (1995/1996), Puerto Rico (1997), Philippines (1997), Japan (2007) and Australia (2007).6,11


Equine influenza was introduced to a naïve, unvaccinated South African horse population by imported horses from the USA in December 1986 and spread widely within a week. The explosive spread was aided by road transport of infected horses, lack of an all-in, all-out post-arrival quarantine policy and poor biosecurity by transport operators, horse trainers and veterinarians. The impact of the outbreak included extensive losses in State revenue due to cancellation of race meetings and subsequent loss of wagering taxes. Major horse events were canceled or had to be rescheduled. The horse industry also incurred significant costs arising from veterinary treatment of sick horses and the costs of compulsory vaccination.4 The disease had a similar impact when it was reintroduced by imported horses in 2003, when once again there was a quarantine breakdown.6


Hong Kong suffered a similar fate in November and December 1992 when an outbreak of equine influenza, introduced by imported horses from UK or Ireland, led to a suspension of racing for one month. The outbreak resulted in the cancellation of seven race meetings, including an international event, with a potential loss of total betting turnover of nearly US$1 billion, over 15% of which would have been returned to the Hong Kong community by way of tax, duty and donations.5,17


Equine influenza was confirmed for the first time in the naïve Australian horse population in August 2007 and was introduced by horses imported from Japan. The incursion arose from a post-arrival quarantine breakdown but how equine influenza virus escaped from the government quarantine station was never established.6 The outbreak sparked the single largest response to an animal disease emergency in Australia’s history and provided an unprecedented challenge to Australia’s emergency animal disease preparedness arrangements. Horse events and movements were disrupted for over six months. Eventually the disease was contained within certain areas in NSW and Queensland and eradicated but only after affecting nearly 10 000 properties and 76 000 horses.18 Governments, the horse industry and dependent businesses suffered significant financial losses. Costs arising directly from the emergency response totaled $A97.7 million and over $A263 million was provided in government support and assistance packages to individuals and organizations. The economic impact on the horse industry and dependent business was probably billions of dollars but a lack of reliable data, particularly in the non-racing sector, made it difficult to quantify the losses.19


Disease outbreaks can also have profound human impact. During the Australian equine influenza outbreak, the psycho-social effects of the outbreak and the control response were measured using data collected by large online survey. Extremely high levels of non-specific psychological distress were reported by respondents, with 34% reporting high levels of psychological distress, compared to levels of around 12% in the general Australian population.20


Even diseases that do not infect horses can disrupt normal horse-related activity. The outbreak of FMD in the UK in 2001 had a devastating effect on the horse industry as well as on the farming community. Estimated horse industry losses reached £100 million per month in the first three months of the outbreak and the majority of horse-related sporting events were canceled.21



International regulatory framework


The World Trade Organization


The World Trade Organization (WTO)22 deals with the global rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to ensure international trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible. Under the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement), WTO member countries are required to base their sanitary import measures on science-based principles and guidelines, where they exist.23 Sanitary measures relate to human and animal health and phytosanitary measures relate to plant health.


The WTO recognizes the World Organization for Animal Health, better known as the Office Internationale Epizooties (OIE), as the international reference organization for the animal health standards upon which import measures are based. Countries can legitimately adopt import restrictions more stringent than OIE standards if they can demonstrate a scientific need, which in practice means that quarantine conditions in excess of OIE standards should be based on a transparent risk analysis. The SPS Agreement also promotes recognition of the concept of disease-free zones and compartments within countries.



Office Internationale des Epizooties


The OIE, established in 1924, is the World Organization for Animal Health and is based in Paris. In 2011 the number of OIE member countries totaled 178, each of which is represented by a delegate to the World Assembly of Delegates (the decision-making body).24 OIE’s mission is to improve animal health and welfare and prevent the international spread of serious animal diseases.


OIE health standards relevant to the international movement of horses are the Terrestrial Animal Health Code and the Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals. Both are regularly updated as new scientific information comes to light.



OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code


The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code25 (the Code) is an essential reference for any official veterinarian involved in international trade. It is periodically updated and available online.


Volume I contains general provisions relating to:



Volume II contains a chapter for each OIE listed disease and recommended wording for international veterinary certification relating to that disease. Criteria are presented which countries or zones must satisfy to be recognized as free from African horse sickness, equine influenza, dourine, glanders and VEE.



OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals


The OIE Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals26 (the ‘Manual’) is also available online. The purpose of the Manual is to foster harmonization of diagnostic methods for OIE listed diseases and other diseases of importance to international trade. Standards are described for laboratory diagnostic tests and for the production of veterinary vaccines. Specific chapters cover each of the diseases listed in the Code. Each disease chapter includes a well-referenced summary intended to provide information for veterinary officials and other readers who need a general overview of the tests and vaccines available for each disease. This is followed by a text giving greater detail for laboratory workers. The Manual also includes a list of OIE Reference Laboratories which have been designated by the OIE as centers of excellence in their particular field.



Diseases listed by OIE


The OIE maintains lists of notifiable diseases that member countries are required to monitor if they wish to take part in international trade. The most significant criterion for inclusion of a disease in the OIE list is its potential for international spread. Other criteria include zoonotic potential and capacity for significant spread within naïve populations.


Listed equine diseases include African horse sickness, contagious equine metritis, dourine, equine encephalomyelitis (Western), equine infectious anemia, equine influenza, equine piroplasmosis, equine rhinopneumonitis, equine viral arteritis, glanders, Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (VEE). Other significant diseases of horses such as equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern), Japanese encephalitis, screwworm, surra, vesicular stomatitis and West Nile fever are listed as multiple species diseases.


Reporting obligations are outlined Chapter 1.1 of the Terrestrial Code. Immediate reporting by veterinary authorities of member countries to OIE headquarters is required in the following epidemiological situations – the first occurrence of a listed disease; recurrence of a listed disease following a report declaring that an outbreak had ended; first occurrence of a new strain of a known pathogen; and any sudden and unexpected increase in distribution, incidence, morbidity or mortality of a listed endemic disease. Countries also now have to report immediately any emerging disease with significant morbidity or mortality or apparent zoonotic potential, even if unlisted.


In addition, each country maintains a schedule of diseases notifiable under its own animal health legislation, drawn from the above lists. Because some important diseases are not universally notifiable, the Thoroughbred industry has developed its own international reporting system through the International Thoroughbred Breeders Meeting. Quarterly disease reports are submitted to a collating center at the Animal Health Trust, Newmarket, England, and distributed to participating countries.27



Import risk analysis


Risk analysis is a valuable tool for decision making that can assist global movement of horses and open up new markets without compromising the health status of importing countries.


As mentioned earlier in this review, WTO Member Countries are encouraged to base quarantine conditions (SPS measures) on international standards, guidelines and recommendations or on a scientific assessment of risk. The Terrestrial Code25 is the international standard referenced in the SPS Agreement and contains guidelines and principles for the conduct of import risk analyzes in Chapter 2.1.


The components of risk analysis are hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management and risk communication.23 Briefly, the procedure should be science based and involves assessment and documentation of:



Risk communication involves exchange of information and opinions with potentially affected and interested parties at all stages of the process.


Risk analysis has already proved its value in overcoming potential barriers to the international movement of athletic horses testing positive for piroplasmosis. Government authorities in the USA and Australia used risk analysis as a decision-making tool when considering import of horses for the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta28 and the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney.29

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Jun 18, 2016 | Posted by in EQUINE MEDICINE | Comments Off on International movement of athletic horses: Quarantine and regulatory controls

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