IAN J.H. DUNCAN

Department of Animal Biosciences, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada

A short consideration of the history of how animals have been dealt with by various moral philosophers sets the scene for how they are regarded today. Much of this early history is taken from Preece (2002). Of the early Greek philosophers, Aristotle (384–322 bc) is the one who made specific reference to animals. He believed that the ability to reason is the highest of all abilities and it is this that sets human beings (actually Greeks!) above all other creatures. Aristotle also introduced the teleological argument of ‘things being there for a purpose’, e.g., ‘the purpose of rain is to water the plants’. From these two ideas, a great hierarchical structure was built in which those with more reason should control those with less, with Gods being superior to men and controlling them, men being superior to women, Greeks being superior to other races, human beings being superior to animals, and so on. According to this structure, human beings had absolute authority over all animals.

This view continued to be held for about 2000 years. In the medieval period, Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274) rediscovered Aristotle’s writings and agreed that it was the ability to reason (or rationality) that made human beings distinct from all other animals. However, he gave Aristotle’s ideas a Christian twist. He postulated that animals do not have immortal souls. He claimed that human beings had no direct obligations to animals. However, they might have indirect moral obligations, in that people who mistreat animals may (i) pick up cruel habits and then treat other human beings badly, and (ii) perpetrate a property wrong against the owner of the animal. According to Aquinas, animals do not have moral standing; they only have instrumental value.

Jumping to the seventeenth century, René Descartes (1596–1650) is often thought of as the father of modern philosophy. He is usually singled out for special blame for introducing the idea of animals as ‘automata’ or machines. However, in a more considered review of Descartes’ works, Cottingham (1978) points out that even though Descartes states that animals have no thought or language he does not actually say that they have no feelings or sensations. Indeed, Kenny (1970, p.207) translates Descartes as saying, ‘Similarly of all the things which dogs, horses and monkeys are made to do, are merely expressions of their fear, their hope, or their joy; and consequently, they can do these things without any thought’. Present-day scholars continue to argue about what Descartes really meant by this. The fact that he was a vivisectionist, and did not treat animals as if they were sentient, suggests that he thought that ‘fear’, ‘hope’, and ‘joy’ were in some way unconscious emotions. ‘Unconscious emotion’ is a difficult concept to understand and is currently being debated (Őhman et al., 2000; Winkielman and Berridge, 2004). Like Aristotle and Aquinas, Descartes also believed that rationality distinguished human beings from other animals and he added that language, which he regarded to be a uniquely human attribute, is the only real test of rationality. However, as suggested by the translated passage above, his translators and interpreters may have gone too far in blaming him for ‘animals are machines’. He does seem to allow that animals might have emotions and might be driven by these emotions.

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) was an English philosopher living at the same time as Descartes. In 1651 he wrote the famous book Leviathan, which formed the basis for Western political philosophy. Leviathan concerns the structure of society and legitimate government, and is regarded as one of the earliest and most influential examples of social contract theory. Hobbes’ contention was that human beings act out of self-interest and that this leads to co-operation and social contracts. Since, in Hobbes’ view, animals have no language, they cannot enter into social contracts with other animals or with human beings. They are therefore not worthy of moral consideration. So, whereas Descartes thought that language was important as a sign of rationality, Hobbes thought that it was necessary for the drawing up of social contracts. However, their conclusion was the same: animals do not have language, therefore they do not merit moral consideration.

John Locke (1632–1704) was an English philosopher and considered to be the first of the British Empiricists. Empiricism emphasizes the role of experience, particularly sensory perception, in the formation of ideas. Locke postulated that when people are born, their minds are ‘blank slates’ or ‘tabula rasa’. This was contrary to the previous belief that people were born with innate ideas. Locke also developed Hobbes’ ideas on social contract theory. He was one of the earliest and most influential thinkers of the Enlightenment contributing to political philosophy and liberal theory. It is in Locke’s writings that we get a first glimpse of a change of view with regard to animals. Locke says that there is evidence that animals (or what he calls ‘brutes’) have the capacity to remember. He also allows that animals also seem to have some very simple ideas and they can compare one thing to another – but only very imperfectly. To some extent they can compound (put ideas together) but Locke draws the line at abstraction. He clearly states that animals cannot form abstractions. So, Locke concludes that there are huge differences between human beings and other animals, but that animals do have some simple mental capacities. This is a big departure from calling them ‘automata’.

The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was very important in the development of moral philosophy. He wrote a highly influential little book called Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Kant believed that morality is a case of following absolute rules. For example, he thought that lying was morally wrong and that we should never lie, regardless of the circumstances. Kant’s philosophy was that one should treat a human being as an end in itself and not as a means to an end. He developed the philosophy that human beings have intrinsic (or inherent) value (and not merely instrumental value). The reason they have intrinsic value (once again) is that they have rationality and in particular they can reason about ethics. Animals, on the other hand, cannot reason (particularly about ethics!), and therefore have only instrumental value.

So, these five philosophers, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Hobbes, and Kant, developed a position that has dominated the traditional Western view of how animals should be treated. The position was based on two claims:

The special attribute was rationality, and, in particular, having language and being able to engage in ethical thought. The traditional Christian view incorporated an additional distinction, viz., animals did not have immortal souls. John Locke has been left out of this list because he was the first to realize that the distinction between animals and human beings was not as clear cut as the others suggested.

3.3 The Rise of Utilitarianism

With the emergence of the ‘Enlightenment’ period in Europe, things started to change. The Scottish philosopher, David Hume (1711–1776) wrote, on learning in animals, ‘From the tone of voice the dog infers his master’s anger, and foresees his own punishment. Make a beating follow upon one sign or motion for some time, and afterwards upon another; and he will successively draw different conclusions, according to his most recent experience’ (Hume, 1739, pp.177–178). He thus began to dispute the previous views that animals have no moral standing. Hume was a hardline atheist and so the question of anyone having an immortal soul did not arise.

Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) was an English social reformer who was very concerned about the conditions that many workers were forced to accept during the Industrial Revolution. He worked closely with James Mill, a like-minded Scottish social reformer. In contrast to Kant, Bentham thought that it was the consequences of actions that were important. So, for example, telling a lie might be morally acceptable if the consequences of doing so were better than not telling a lie. He had little to say about animals, with the exception of a brief mention in one of his books. In it he rejected both of the previous claims about animals – that they cannot reason, and that they have no language – outright, and went on to argue that rationality is not the relevant matter. In a well-known passage, he wrote, ‘The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?’ (Bentham, 1823, p.283).

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), the son of James Mill, was a close friend of Jeremy Bentham. He developed Bentham’s ideas into the philosophy of Utilitarianism or The Greatest Happiness Principle (Mill, 1910). According to this principle, ‘Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness’. ‘Happiness’ was defined as pleasure and the absence of pain and ‘unhappiness’ as pain and the privation of pleasure. Bentham and Mill did not wish their new theory to have the title ‘The Greatest Happiness Principle’ and they searched around for another name. They came across the word ‘utilitarian’ in the writings of a Scottish novelist, John Galt, and they asked him if they could use this for the name of their theory, to which Galt agreed.

The person who has vigorously promoted a utilitarian approach to animal welfare is the Australian philosopher Peter Singer (b. 1946) who currently holds the Chair of Bioethics at Princeton University. He published Animal Liberation in 1975 with a fourth edition in 2009 and a 40th anniversary edition in 2015. This was – and remains – a very influential book. Singer (1975) argues that most animal use (including animal agriculture) is deeply objectionable. So, he is arguing about the facts. He says that he is not against using animals or even against killing them, if, and only if, they have a good quality life and a painless death. Interestingly, Singer is also regarded as the father of Animal Rights although he himself is most definitely a utilitarian. The question a utilitarian asks is, ‘What course of conduct promotes the greatest amount of happiness for all those who will be affected?’ A utilitarian approach has proved to be very useful in dealing with various moral dilemmas in human affairs. However, when animals are involved, it becomes extremely difficult to weigh the happiness of human beings against the suffering of animals. For example, how does one balance the suffering of laboratory rabbits being used for the production of antibodies against the happiness of human beings being protected from some dangerous disease by these same antibodies?

3.4 The Emergence of Animal Rights

The idea of giving animals ‘rights’ is very recent, having been proposed in the last quarter of the twentieth century by Tom Regan (1938–2017), who was Professor of Philosophy at North Carolina State University. Using much of the evidence produced by Singer in Animal Liberation, Tom Regan developed the philosophy of Animal Rights and in 1983 published The Case for Animal Rights. In this book he argues that we are all subject of a life, conscious beings, have individual welfare, want and prefer things, and believe and feel things. Therefore we (and all sentient creatures) have inherent value. Regan builds his argument as follows, ‘Individuals who have inherent value have an equal right to be treated with respect… It follows that we must never harm individuals who have inherent value’ (Regan, 1983, p.286). According to Regan, killing is the biggest harm we can do to another individual. The term ‘harm’ is difficult for biologists to understand. A 7-year-old boy being carried kicking and screaming into a clinic to have a flu shot would certainly say he was being harmed. Presumably the parents would say he was not being harmed, but, rather, benefited, by being protected from flu. Exactly the same argument could be made for a cat being taken very reluctantly to the veterinarian to receive some treatment. So, who decides what ‘harm’ means?

Regan was a respected philosopher. His Case for Animal Rights is very well argued. Perhaps unfortunately, his views have dominated Animal Rights philosophy. A philosophy of animal rights does not need to be as extreme as that proposed by Tom Regan. In fact, when people who call themselves ‘animal rightists’ are closely questioned, very few of them have adopted all of Regan’s philosophy. The majority of them actually believe in some form of ‘limited rights’ for animals. For example, Tannenbaum (1995), a philosopher who has written a textbook on veterinary ethics, has argued that some form of ‘limited rights’ might be acceptable. A ‘Limited Rights’ philosophy could be built up as follows: laboratory animals have a right not to be subjected to painful procedures without an analgesic; farm animals have a right to be free from severe frustration (or be free to express strongly motivated behavior); and companion animals have a right to regular exercise and stimulation. The problem with this approach is that one has to have ‘rules’ in place to cover every conceivable situation. It is often easier to take a utilitarian stance and ask, ‘What happens if…?’. If the answer is that happiness will be increased (or suffering will be diminished) then that is the ethically correct thing to do.

The major weaknesses of Animal Rights would seem to be:

3.5 Utilitarianism or Animal Rights?

Which philosophy should a person who is interested in improving animal welfare follow, Utilitarianism or Animal Rights? These philosophies are different in a crucial way, viz., they are different types of philosophies. Utilitarianism is a teleological theory, i.e., a theory that deals with ends or final purposes. In the case of Utilitarianism, the end being sought is the greatest happiness. Animal Rights is a deontological theory, i.e., a theory that deals with that which is binding. It deals with actions, not ends. Both philosophies use the same evidence that the higher animals are ‘subject of a life’, are conscious, sentient creatures, experience individual welfare, can suffer, want and prefer things, and believe and feel things. However, this evidence leads them to different positions. A strict utilitarian believes that animals are worthy of moral consideration, therefore we should try to maximize their total happiness. A complete animal rightist believes that animals have inherent value, therefore they should not be used by human beings at all.

3.6 The Science of Animal Welfare

Animal welfare did not begin to be considered scientifically until the last quarter of the twentieth century. This requires some explanation since there is evidence of some acceptance of sentience, at least in mammals, for hundreds of years. ‘Sentience’ simply means capable of feeling and is the fundamental requirement for an organism to have inherent value. By the time of the Renaissance, there is good evidence from the writings of Leonardo da Vinci, Erasmus, Thomas More, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Francis Bacon, and others, that animal sentience was accepted as part of secular knowledge (Preece, 2002). Many of the great artistic works of this age also portray people treating animals as if they were sentient. However, as previously mentioned, it was not until John Locke (to a minor extent) in the seventeenth century, David Hume in the eighteenth century, and Jeremy Bentham in the nineteenth century that sentience in animals came to be accepted by philosophers. Even then, some eminent philosophers like Immanuel Kant, who lived into the nineteenth century, believed that animals had only instrumental value.

But what of the scientists? It has already been stated that Descartes, living in the eighteenth century, did not treat the live conscious dogs he was dissecting as if they were sentient. In fact, it is not until the middle of the nineteenth century that we find scientists making explicit reference to feelings. William Youatt (1776–1847) was the son of a surgeon who lived in the southwest of England and was educated for the ministry. However, at the age of 34, he gave up his ministry and became assistant to a veterinary surgeon in London. He took classes at the newly founded Veterinary College (later to become the Royal Veterinary College). However, he was not satisfied with the quality of instruction, so he left without a diploma. In those days, formal qualification was not very important, and Youatt soon gained the reputation of being an outstanding veterinarian. He was very prolific and wrote textbooks that are still cited today. Youatt also founded and acted as Editor of The Veterinarian (a professional journal for veterinarians) from 1828 until he died in 1847. However, his humanitarian approach to animals and his understanding of what animal welfare is all about is revealed in a book originally published in 1839 (republished in 2004), entitled The Obligation and Extent of Humanity to Brutes, Principally Considered with Reference to the Domesticated Animals. In this book, Youatt (1839) writes of animals’ senses, emotions, consciousness, attention, memory, sagacity, docility, association of ideas, imagination, reason, instinct, social affections, and the moral qualities of friendship and loyalty. He certainly thought that animals have feelings! More than 30 years before Darwin’s (1872) The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Youatt wrote of the intellectual faculties, ‘We are endeavoring to shew that the difference [between humans and animals] in one of the most essential of all points, is in degree and not in kind’ (Youatt, 1839, p.55). He also wrote, ‘We are operating on animals that have, probably, as keen feelings of pleasure and of pain as ourselves’ (Youatt, 1839, p.234). He condemned as cruel and inhumane many practices that are still being criticized today, including too early training of race horses, steeple-chasing (a British sport in which horses are raced over a track with high brushwood fences), transport methods for newly born calves, raising of veal calves, slaughter-house management, tail-docking and ear-cropping of dogs, using live bait for fishing, and force-feeding of capons (castrated male chickens) and turkeys to produce foie gras.

The person usually credited with transforming biological concepts completely is Charles Darwin (1809–1882), who published The Origin of Species in 1859 (Darwin, 1859). (But remember that Youatt was making similar suggestions more than 30 years before this.) Some scholars believe Darwin had material left over from The Origin which he incorporated into The Descent of Man (Darwin, 1871) and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Darwin, 1872). In both of these books he suggests that the emotions had also evolved, and he gives good descriptions of the expression of these emotions in various species. However, he says nothing about the subjective experience of having emotions. This was left to a prominent biologist and follower of Darwin, George John Romanes (1848–1894), who was explicit about the subjective experience of emotions. In a book entitled Mental Evolution in Animals, he wrote that ‘Pleasures and Pains must have been evolved as the subjective accompaniment of processes which are respectively beneficial or injurious to the organism, and so evolved for the purpose or to the end that the organism should seek the one and shun the other’ (Romanes, 1884). Later he stated, ‘Thus, then we see that the affixing of painful or disagreeable states of consciousness to deleterious changes of the organism, and the reverse states to reverse changes, has been a necessary function of the survival of the fittest.’ So, by the 1880s, Romanes was describing emotions almost exactly as would a modern-day welfare scientist (Duncan, 1996).

Why did it take so long for feelings to be accepted as critical for welfare? The reason for the resistance to these enlightened nineteenth-century views lies in the rise of ‘Behaviorism’, a very important school of psychology, especially in North America. Behaviorists spoke out strongly against paying any attention to ‘feelings’ or ‘consciousness’ right through the twentieth century into the 1970s. For example, one of the founding fathers of Behaviorism, William James (1904, p.477), said,

Stay updated, free articles. Join our Telegram channel

Join